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Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n: The Court Legalizes Sports
Gambling, but Constitutional
Questions Remain
JOSEPH STIERS*
In Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,1 the
Supreme Court held the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection act of 1992 (PASPA) violated the anticommandeering doctrine under the Tenth Amendment for
prohibiting the modification or repeal of state-law
restrictions on private conduct.2 The decision added yet
another exception to the list of anti-commandeering drafting
rules formed out of New York v. United States3 and Printz v.
United States.4 Murphy abrogated PASPA, resulting in the
legalization of sports gambling under federal law.5
The outcome of this case was a major victory for the
gambling industry and presents an extraordinary instance of
judicial legislation.6 Unlike New York and Printz, where a
relatively minor portion of the statute was severed,7 the
Murphy Court elected to abrogate all of PASPA.8 Although
Congress could redraft a version of PASPA prohibiting sports
gambling without commandeering the states, the current
Joseph Stiers, J. BUS. & TECH. L.
Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
2 Id. at 1473-74.
3 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992).
4 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
5 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484.
6 See infra Part IV.B.
7 See infra Part II.A.
8 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484.
*
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Congress is unlikely to address an apolitical issue from
twenty-six years ago.9 As a result, the Supreme Court
effectively legalized sports gambling across America.10
While this decision acted as a remedy for New Jersey
and other states regarding sports gambling, the anticommandeering doctrine does not address the more relevant
question of whether the federal government can impose
regulations on some states while exempting others.11 Murphy
did not remedy the critical flaw of PASPA, which was
designed to stop the “spread of sports gambling” by allowing
states that previously authorized sports gambling to
maintain such laws, while barring future states from
participation.12 This question was addressed under the
“doctrine of equal sovereignty of the states” by the Third
Circuit in 2013,13 but not discussed by the Supreme Court,
leaving the issue unresolved.14 In the future, laws that grant
certain states economic advantages over others will need to
be addressed on equal sovereignty grounds.15
I.

THE CASE

On December 8, 2011, the New Jersey Legislature amended
the New Jersey Constitution to permit sports gambling in
See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.B.
11 See infra Part IV.C.
12 Id.
13 See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d
Cir. 2013) (stating that the petitioners should have challenged the
validity of the grandfathering provision, rather than PASPA’s general
prohibition of sports gambling).
14 Christie v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 189 L. Ed. 2d 806, cert.
denied 134 S. Ct. 2866, (2014).
15 See infra Part IV.C; Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New
Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 237 (3d Cir. 2013); Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist.
No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133
S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
9
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Atlantic City casinos and New Jersey racetracks.16
Subsequently, the legislature amended the Casino Control
Act to allow sports wagering.17 On August 7, 2012, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) filed a
complaint,18 claiming that the Sports Wagering Law violated
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992
(PASPA).19 PASPA prohibited states and individuals from
sponsoring, operating, advertising, promoting, licensing, or
authorizing any form of gambling on competitive games
involving amateur or professional athletes.20 When PASPA
was enacted, Congress provided a one-year window for states
which operated licensed casinos to authorize sports
wagering, but New Jersey declined to enact sports-wagering
laws at that time.21
In February 2013, the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey held that PASPA was constitutional
and preempted New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law.22 The
court granted a permanent injunction against New Jersey’s
Sports Wagering Law.23 New Jersey appealed and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the
decision in Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New
Jersey (hereinafter, Christie I), holding that PASPA did not
violate the anti-commandeering principle under the Tenth
N.J. CONST., art. IV, sec. VII, paras. 2(D), (F).
N.J.S.A. 5:12A-1 et seq. (2011).
18 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553
(D.N.J.), aff'd sub nom., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of
N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
19 PASPA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2012).
20 Id. § 3702.
21 Id. § 3704.
22 See Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (holding that the Government had
a rational basis for PASPA, and that PASPA did not violate the Tenth
Amendment).
23 Id. at 578.
16
17
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Amendment.24 The Third Circuit also held that the principle
of equal sovereignty was insufficient grounds to invalidate
PASPA.25 In the majority opinion, Judge Fuentes rejected the
anti-commandeering claim because PASPA did not force
states to take an affirmative action, but added that the
prevention of a state's right to repeal its own laws would
violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.26 New Jersey
petitioned for certiorari and was denied.27
In response to Judge Fuentes’ opinion, the New Jersey
State Senate enacted Senate Bill 2250, partially repealing
the state’s existing prohibitions on sports gambling, but only
allowing sports wagering at licensed casinos and
racetracks.28 Governor Christie vetoed the bill, claiming it
was an “attempt to circumvent the Third Circuit’s Ruling . .
.[.]”29 On October 17, 2014, Governor Christie changed
positions and signed Senate Bill 2460, repealing New
Jersey’s prohibition on sports wagering.30 The repeal stated
provisions, which only allowed sports wagering at casinos
and racetracks.31
Following the 2014 Law, the NCAA again sued New
Jersey on the grounds that the new law was preempted by
PASPA.32 The district court held the 2014 Law was
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208,
237 (3d Cir. 2013).
25 Id. at 239.
26 Id. at 232.
27 Christie v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 S. Ct. 2866, 189 L. Ed.
2d 806 (2014) (cert. denied).
28 S. 2250, 216th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2014) (vetoed).
29 Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2016 WL 7321803 (U.S.), 9
(Brief opposing cert.).
30 S. 2460, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014).
31 Id.
32 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 492
(D.N.J. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor
of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, opinion
vacated (Oct. 14, 2015), on reh'g en banc, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), and
24
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preempted by PASPA33 and the Amateur and Professional
Sports Leagues were entitled to permanent injunction.34 New
Jersey appealed and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's decision, noting, “[t]he presence
of the word ‘repeal’ does not prevent us from examining what
the provision actually does, [which] . . . does not change the
fact that the 2014 Law selectively grants permission to
certain entities to engage in sports gambling.”35 Judge
Fuentes dissented, standing by his original opinion from
Christie I, that PASPA’s prohibition of a state-law repeal
violated the anti-commandeering doctrine within the Tenth
Amendment.36 In August 2016, the case was reheard, en
banc, and the Third Circuit affirmed that New Jersey’s 2014
Law effectively authorized sports gambling by specific
entities, in violation of PASPA.37 New Jersey petitioned for
certiorari, which was granted on June 27, 2017.38 The
Supreme Court consolidated Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n with New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's
aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of N.J., 832
F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016).
33 Id. at 506.
34 Id. at 508.
35 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259,
266 (3d Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Oct. 14, 2015),
on reh'g en banc, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. New
Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017), and cert. granted sub nom. Christie v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017).
36 Id. at 271 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
37 See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d
389, 396-402 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. New Jersey
Thoroughbred Horsemen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017), and cert. granted sub nom. Murphy v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017).
38 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017) (cert.
granted).
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Ass'n v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n39 to answer the
question of whether a PASPA unconstitutionally
commandeered the regulatory power of the states by
prohibiting the repeal of state law.40
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Tenth Amendment states, “[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”41 For most of the modern era, the Tenth Amendment
acted as little more than a declaratory relationship between
the states and national government.42 In 1992, the Court
shifted gears, invalidating an environmental regulation on
Tenth Amendment grounds for commandeering states to
enforce federal law in New York v. United States.43 The anticommandeering doctrine was reinforced five years later in
Printz v. United States,44 but remained narrow in scope.45 In
similarly surprising fashion, the equal sovereignty doctrine
recently emerged in Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder.46 The unique
structure of PASPA has raised both anti-commandeering and
equal sovereignty questions.47
N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 824 (2017).
40 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
41 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
42 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
43 505 U.S. 144, 188, (1992).
44 See 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (ruling that a portion of the Brady Act
conscripting state law enforcement officers to assist in carrying out the
federal law was unconstitutional commandeering under the Tenth
Amendment).
45 See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 231 (“[S]tatutes prohibiting the states from
taking certain actions have never been struck down even if they require
the expenditure of some time and effort or the modification or
invalidation of contrary state laws.”).
46 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
47 See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 231-40.
39
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Section II.A conveys the history of the Tenth
Amendment and the emergence of the anti-commandeering
doctrine in New York v. United States and Printz v. United
States. Section II.B examines the equal sovereignty principle.
Section II.C discusses the political conditions leading up to
New Jersey’s challenge of PASPA and the implications of
interstate politics on federal law.
A. New York and Printz rewrite the Tenth
Amendment: The emergence of the anticommandeering doctrine.
The modern anti-commandeering doctrine formed out of New
York v. United States, but anti-commandeering principles
date back to 1842 in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.48 In Prigg, the
Supreme Court held that the states cannot be compelled to
enforce national law and it “might” be unconstitutional for
the national government to compel states to carry out federal
duties.49 Subsequently, other cases upheld this language, but
only when a law directly forced states to act affirmatively.50
During the twentieth century, the Court rarely considered
Tenth Amendment challenges, given the Federal
Government’s enumerated rights to preempt state law,
within the Commerce51 and the Supremacy Clauses.52
The Federal Government regularly coerces states to
comply with federal regulations via preemption under the
Supremacy Clause or via federal spending powers.53
Prigg v. Com. of Pa., 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
Id. at 615-16.
50 See, e.g., Com. of Ky. v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 109-10 (1860), overruled
by Puerto Rico v Branstad, 483 US 219 (1987).
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
53 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (outlining traditional
methods Congress uses to coerce states into complying with federal
regulations).
48
49
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Therefore, Congress need not create laws that expressly
mandate affirmative enforcement by state officials.54 In New
York v. United States, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act55 provided three compliance incentives. The third
incentive acted more like a mandate—forcing states to take
possession of radioactive waste.56 The Court in New York,
relied heavily on dicta from FERC v. Mississippi,57 and Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.58 to
determine that a Tenth Amendment limitation existed on
Congress’s power to commandeer states.59 At the time of New
York v. United States, anti-commandeering under the Tenth
Amendment was relatively unprecedented.60 The Court even
cited an unusual 1911 opinion61 in search of affirmative
support.62 The Supreme Court did not intend to overrule
centuries of precedent supporting federal preemption, but
rather carved out a narrow exception, barring the Federal
Government from compelling state legislatures to enforce
federal law.63
This exception broadened in Printz, where the Court
invalidated a provision of the Brady Act64 requiring state law
See id.
Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, PUB. L. NO. 96–573,
94 Stat. 3347 (1980).
56 New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
57 456 U.S. 742, 758-59 (1982).
58 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
59 New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69.
60 Although New York relied on dicta from Hodel and Ferc, both of those
cases ultimately upheld federal preemption. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 749;
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
61 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). The Court in Coyle discussed the
equal sovereignty requirement for new states admitted to the union, but
also held that Federal statute could not prevent a state from relocating
its capital under the Tenth Amendment. Id.
62 New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. at 565).
63 New York, 505 U.S. at 179.
64 The Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012).
54
55
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enforcement officers to take part in background checks for
gun purchasers.65 In Printz, the Court additionally ruled that
Congress cannot circumvent the holding from New York, by
“conscripting the State’s officers directly.”66
While the anti-commandeering doctrine expanded in
Printz, the Supreme Court had not struck down any federal
laws on commandeering grounds post-Printz.67 Congress
properly reacted to the rulings in New York and Printz and
carefully developed subsequent regulations to avoid actively
commandeering state officials.68 The constitutionality of
conditional
spending
and
preemption
maintains
69
overwhelmingly precedential support. Further, in Reno v.
Condon,70 the Supreme Court relied on South Carolina v.
Baker,71 distinguishing New York and Printz, and
significantly narrowing the scope of the anti-commandeering
doctrine.72 In Condon, the Court acknowledged that the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act did burden state officials with
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
Id.
67 See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (narrowing the precedential
scope of New York and Printz).
68 See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 542 (2012).
While this case involved a Tenth Amendment issue of excessive use of
federal spending powers, the drafters of the Affordable Care Act were
careful not to directly conscript state legislatures or state officials to
enforce the individual mandate. Id.
69 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (citing a series of
precedents supporting the constitutionality of conditional spending and
federal preemption).
70 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
71 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
72 See Condon, 528 U.S. at 150-51 (“Such ‘commandeering’ is, however, an
inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity. Any federal
regulation demands compliance. That a State wishing to engage in
certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative
action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a
commonplace that presents no constitutional defect.”) (quoting South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515 (1988)).
65
66
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the “day-to-day responsibility for administering its complex
provisions.”73 Nevertheless, the Court held that the state
regulation did not qualify as commandeering because the
regulation did not seek to control the manner in which state
officials regulated private parties.74 Condon effectively
limited the scope of New York and Printz to laws and
regulations that directly conscript states or state officials to
carry out federal orders.75 Simply burdening state officials
with the day-to-day work of compliance is insufficient
grounds for a Tenth Amendment claim.76
B. The emergence of the equal sovereignty
doctrine.
The doctrine of equal sovereignty emerged out of dicta from
Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder77 and was
implemented in Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder.78 Prior principles
supporting equal sovereignty are scattered throughout the
Constitution. Article I, § 8, cl. 1 requires uniformity in duties
and imposts.79 Article I, § 9, cl. 6 requires uniformity in
regulation of state ports to prevent economic advantages
between states.80 Article IV, § 2, cl. 1 prevents states from
discriminating against citizens of other states, granting
citizens the right to freely travel among states with the full
legal rights of in-state residents.81 Additionally, the Supreme
Court held that equal sovereignty was an essential principle
Id. at 150.
Id.
75 Id. at 150-51.
76 Id.
77557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009).
78133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
80 Id., § 9, cl. 6.
81 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. (The Privileges and Immunities Clause).
73
74
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when admitting new states to the Union.82 Later, in State of
S.C. v. Katzenbach,83 the Court distinguished Coyle, holding
that equal sovereignty only applied to the admittance of new
states.84
In 2013, Shelby Cty. overruled Katzenbach, finding §
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 196585 to be unconstitutional
under the doctrine of equal sovereignty.86 Citing dicta from
Coyle, United States v. Louisiana,87 and Northwest Austin,
the Court concluded that equal sovereignty was a
longstanding constitutional principle.88 While Shelby Cty.
presented equal sovereignty as an established state right, the
breadth of this holding has been questioned.89 First, Shelby
Cty. was a five to four decision.90 Second, the holding in
Shelby Cty. limited the scope of a longstanding statute
designed to prevent voter discrimination, which is politically
controversial.91 Third, the principle of equal sovereignty has
yet to be extended to matters beyond the admittance of new
See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911) (holding that U.S. CONST.
art. 4, § 3 specifically grants equal sovereignty to newly admitted states).
83 383 U.S. 301 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S.
Ct. 2612 (2013).
84 Id. at 329.
85 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012).
86 133 S. Ct. at 2623-24.
87 382 U.S. 288 (1965).
88 See 133 S. Ct. at 2623-24 (“[T]he constitutional equality of the States is
essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the
Republic was organized.”) (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567
(1911)).
89 See, e.g., Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 239 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing
Shelby Cty.’s equal sovereignty holding from PASPA on several grounds).
90 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
91 See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2632-35; 2640-41 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing several modern, “second-generation barriers” to
minority voting and factual examples of racially-motivated voting
procedures that were blocked by the reauthorization of the VRA’s
preclearance requirement in 2006).
82
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states and voting rights.92 In Christie I, the Third Circuit
addressed the equal sovereignty concerns of PASPA,93 but
elected not to extend Shelby Cty.’s holding.94 The Christie I
court explained, “there is nothing in Shelby County to
indicate that the equal sovereignty principle is meant to
apply with the same force outside the context of ‘sensitive
areas of state and local policymaking.’”95
The Third Circuit also indicated that New Jersey
incorrectly applied the principle of equal sovereignty.96 “It is
noteworthy that Appellants do not ask us to invalidate §
3704(a)(2), the Nevada grandfathering provision that
supposedly creates the equal sovereignty problem.”97 While
statutory
grandfather
clauses
have
been
held
98
constitutional, prior cases did not address grandfather
clauses that specifically granted rights to certain states while
prohibiting those rights from the other states.99 The
emergence of the equal sovereignty doctrine indicates that
the specific type of grandfather clause utilized in PASPA
could have constitutional problems.100
See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 239.
Id. at 237-39.
94 Id. at 239.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981); see also
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
99 Compare Christie I, 730 F.3d at 239 (analyzing the constitutionality of
a grandfather clause that discriminates between the legal rights of states)
with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 471 (upholding the
constitutionality of a grandfather clause affecting the legal rights of
private businesses with residual effects on interstate commerce).
100 See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct at 2624 ([A]s we made clear in Northwest
Austin, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly
pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”) (citing
557 U.S., at 203, 129 S.Ct. 2504).
92
93
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C. PASPA
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992
was enacted with rational basis101 under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.102 Congress has long recognized a
federal interest in regulating gambling.103 Specifically,
Congress created PASPA to prevent the spread of sports
gambling, while allowing a grandfather clause to protect
state economies that already significantly relied on sports
gambling.104 There was very little reaction to the law in 1992
because states that prohibited sports gambling had no
interest in authorizing it.105 In 1992, very few states
authorized casino gambling, which was extremely limited
outside of Nevada and New Jersey.106
This began to change in the late 1990s and early 2000s
when a wave of states began legalizing casino gambling.107
The rapid growth of state-authorized casino gambling was
largely a reactionary economic phenomenon.108 When new
states legalized casino gambling, neighboring states’
New Jersey did not contest that PASPA met the rational basis test.
The purpose of PASPA was to “stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports
gambling.” Christie I, 730 F.3d at 239.
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
103 See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding federal
law prohibiting sales of lottery tickets as valid exercise of Government
commerce power).
104 See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 239.
105 New Jersey and certain other states had the option to legalize sports
gambling within one year of the enactment of PASPA, but elected to
maintain state-law prohibitions. PASPA, 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012).
106 Various tribal casinos existed outside of state jurisdiction. Certain
states also legalized riverboat casino and low stakes gambling parlors.
George G. Fenich, A Chronology of Legal Gaming in the U.S., 3 GAMING
RES. & REV. J. 65, 70-5 (1996).
107 J. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law®: The Third Wave of Legal
Gambling, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 361, 384-85 (2010).
108 See id.
101
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economies suffered as residents crossed borders to gamble at
casinos.109 In response, states traditionally opposed to casino
gambling began legalizing gambling to counteract money lost
to neighboring states.110 As a result, New Jersey’s casino
income was devastated by emerging casinos in West Virginia,
Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and eventually New
York.111 This recent development made PASPA relevant as
New Jersey scrambled to revive its struggling gaming
economy.112
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING

In Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the Supreme
Court held that PASPA violated the anti-commandeering
doctrine under the Tenth Amendment.113 Further, the Court
held that § 3702(1) was not severable from PASPA,
effectively removing all federal prohibitions on sports
gambling.114 The majority interpreted PASPA’s ban on any
new authorization as commandeering on the grounds that a
state’s act of repealing old laws inherently authorizes the
previously prohibited conduct from those laws.115 “[S]tate
‘authorization’ makes sense only against the backdrop of
prohibition or regulation[,]” and thus the Court reasoned that
See id.
See id. at 186 (describing the domino effect of state authorized
gambling).
111 See Atlantic City Gaming Revenue: Annual Statistics for Total, Slot,
Table, & Internet Win, 1978-2016, UNLV CENTER FOR GAMING
RESEARCH, 1, 2 (Jan. 2017), http://gaming.unlv.edu/reports/ac_hist.pdf
(showing declining revenues in Atlantic City casinos from 2007 through
2015).
112 N.J. STAT. ANN. 5:12A-7 (2014), invalidated by NCAA v. Governor of
N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d Cir. 2016).
113 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1474 (2018).
114 Id. at 1483-84.
115 Id. at 1474.
109
110
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a state cannot prohibit authorization without prohibiting
repeal.116
Despite the government’s claim that “a statute should
not be held unconstitutional if there is any reasonable
interpretation can save it[,]”117 the Court determined that no
interpretation could save PASPA.118 The majority then
presented a structural argument for the importance of the
Tenth Amendment and the history of the anticommandeering doctrine, concluding that the anticommandeering is important to (1) prevent tyranny, by
balancing powers between the national and state
government; (2) promote political accountability by making
Congress accountable for its own regulations; and (3) to
“prevent[] Congress from shifting the cost of regulations to
the states.”119
The Court then stated that PASPA violated the anticommandeering doctrine by “unequivocally dictat[ing] what
a state legislature may and may not do.”120 The majority
further distinguished other preemption cases to show that
those cases did not directly commandeer state legislative
processes.121 The Court concluded the preemption discussion
by stating, “regardless of the language sometimes used by
Congress and this Court, every form of preemption is based
on a federal law that regulates the conduct of private actors,
not the States.”122
Throughout this analysis, the majority firmly
abrogated § 3702(1) of PASPA for regulating the conduct of
Id.
See id. at 1475 (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830, 841-42
(2018)).
118 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478-79.
119 Id. at 1475-77.
120 Id. at 1478.
121 Id. at 1479.
122 Id. at 1481.
116
117
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the states.123 The more controversial and impactful aspect of
this decision followed with the Court’s subsequent analysis
of the severability of § 3702(2), restricting private conduct.124
The majority reasoned that Congress would not have wanted
§ 3702(2) to remain if § 3702(1) was abrogated because §
3702(1) and § 3702(2) were meant to work in tandem.125 The
Court explained that § 3702(1) existed to enable a lawsuit
against the state, while § 3702(2) existed for potential suits
against private actors for the same goal of preventing state
legalization of sports gambling.126 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that § 3702(2) must also be stricken as well as
PASPA’s provisions prohibiting the advertising of sports
gambling.127
In the dissent, Justice Ginsburg took the opposite
approach, stating “[n]othing in these § 3702(1) and §
3702(2) prohibitions commands States to do anything other
than desist from conduct federal law proscribes.” 128 The
dissent further attacked the majority’s severability decision
by highlighting its unusual divergence from the ordinary
approach of only severing problematic portions, while leaving
the statute intact.129 The dissent concluded by attacking the
majority’s assumptions about congressional intent, arguing
that Congress intended to stop sports gambling regimes and
there was no rational basis to conclude Congress would have
preferred no statute versus allowing § 3702(2) to remain.130
Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, elaborated on the issue of severability, contending that
§ 3702(2) did not intend to work in tandem with § 3702(1),
Id.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481.
125 Id. at 1482-83.
126 Id. at 1483.
127 Id. at 1483-84.
128 Id. at 1489 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting).
129 Id. at 1489.
130 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1490.
123
124
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but was rather a safety net against the potential severability
of § 3702(1).131 Additionally, Justice Thomas added a
concurring opinion, which warned the Court against its
recent approach to severability, which in his belief, impedes
on longstanding limitations on judicial power.132
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court’s decision to overturn PASPA under the
anti-commandeering doctrine likely will have minimal
precedential value, yet enormous effects on the sports and
gambling industries.133 PASPA was drafted in an extremely
unusual manner134 and this decision, like prior anticommandeering decisions, will serve to eliminate this
particular method of drafting.135 Whether the Court decided
this case correctly, depends heavily on the interpretation of
the word “authorization.”136
See id. at 1488 (Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The first says that a State cannot authorize sports gambling schemes
under state law; the second says that (just in case a State finds a way to
do so) sports gambling schemes that a State authorizes are unlawful
under federal law regardless.”).
132 See id. at 1485-87 (Thomas, J. concurring). Justice Thomas’s strongly
admonished the Court’s recent approach to severability, yet declined to
dissent in this case, citing that neither party asked the Court to
reconsider the severability precedents. Id. at 1487.
133 See infra Part IV.A.1.
134 See PASPA, 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (prohibiting governmental entities
from authorizing sports gambling by law, rather than outright
prohibiting sports gambling as conduct).
135 Since New York, Congress cannot draft a statute conscripting state
governments to enforce federal regulations. 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
Since Printz, Congress cannot draft statutes that conscript state officials
to enforce federal regulations. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). After Murphy,
Congress can no longer draft statutes that appear to prohibit states from
repealing or modifying their own laws. 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1474 (2018).
136 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito determined that authorization
could only possibly be considered in the context of existing prohibitions
131
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The Court overstepped its bounds by striking down
PASPA rather than merely severing § 3702(1).137 The
majority’s assumptions about whether Congress would have
wanted PASPA to remain if § 3702(1) was stricken were quite
speculative.138 A deeper look into the history of PASPA and
the reasoning behind the strange drafting of this statute
reveals that the majority’s assumptions about the intent of
Congress in 1992 were likely mistaken.139
Further, the anti-commandeering doctrine cannot
resolve the issue of whether Congress should be able to
prohibit conduct in some states while allowing it in others.140
The Constitutional question regarding statutes that
discriminate between states’ rights will likely need to be
addressed by the Court, as neighboring states compete in a
race-to-the-bottom to legalize gambling, marijuana, and
other future conduct.141 States are approaching a unique
and therefore a bar on state authorization was effectively a bar on
repealing existing state laws. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474. Writing for the
dissent, Justice Ginsburg concluded that PASPA does nothing more than
command states to “desist from conduct federal law proscribes.” Id. at
1489 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
137 Id. at 1489 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“When a statute reveals a
constitutional flaw, the Court ordinarily engages in a salvage rather than
a demolition operation . . . .”).
138 See id. at 1482-1484 (majority opinion) (engaging in a series of if-then
inquiries into what Congress would have wanted if it had known that §
3702(1) was invalidated).
139 See id. at 1488 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing S. REP. No. 102–248, at 4–6 (1991)) (explaining that the “obvious”
purpose of PASPA was to “keep sports gambling from spreading[]” and
Congress could have created § 3702(2) as a “backup, called into play is
subsection (1)’s requirements, directed to the States, turned out to be
unconstitutional—which, of course, is what happened.”).
140 See infra Part IV.C.1.
141 See, e.g., Lucy Dadayan, The Blinken Report: State Revenues from
Gambling: Short-Term Relief, Long-Term Disappointment, THE NELSON
A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT I, at 2 (April, 2016)
(indicating that between 1990 and 2015, the number of states authorizing
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crisis, where economic interests conflict with traditional
state social welfare interests.142 The Supreme Court did not
address equal sovereignty in the current case because that
argument was rejected by the Third Circuit in Christie I and
certiorari was denied.143
Section IV.A analyzes the impact of Murphy on the
scope of the anti-commandeering doctrine. Section IV.B
criticizes the Court’s application of the severability doctrine
to invalidate all of PASPA and questions the Court’s “political
accountability” justification for its decision to abrogate
PASPA under anti-commandeering. Section IV.C explains
why laws like PASPA should be addressed under the equal
sovereignty principle and assesses the future impact of the
Court’s decision in Murphy.
A. Did
the
Court
expand
the
anticommandeering doctrine to include inaction
or merely require Congress to draft more
carefully?
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito determined that state
authorization is a concept that could “make sense only
against a backdrop of prohibition or regulation.”144 The
opinion also discussed the history of anti-commandeering
casino gambling increased from two to seventeen); see also Joseph
MisuIonas, These Charts Show the Evolution of America’s Marijuana
Laws Over Time, CIVILIZED (Aug. 31, 2017), http://www.civilized.
life/articles/evolution-america-marijuana-laws-charts/ (displaying the
rapid growth of legalized marijuana; since 1996, 28 states legalized
medical marijuana with eight states legalizing recreational marijuana).
142 See Dadayan, supra note 141, at 5 (citing efforts to counteract
interstate competition for gambling revenue as a purpose for why states
legalize gambling).
143 Christie v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (mem.)
(2014).
144 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 146, 1474 (2018).
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and concluded that the three most significant justifications
for the anti-commandeering principle were: protection of
liberty, political accountability, and prevention of costshifting to the states.145 Subsequently, the Court decided that
prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling violated
the anti-commandeering rule.146
“The provision unequivocally dictates what a state
legislature may and may not do. And this is true under either
our interpretation or that advocated by respondents and the
United States.”147
This
statement
subtly
expands
the
anticommandeering doctrine to include inactions.148 Previously,
the anti-commandeering doctrine only applied when federal
law conscripted state governments or state officials to take a
positive action.149 Yet, how can the anti-commandeering
doctrine prevent Congress from making laws prohibiting
conduct within the states when the Supremacy Clause
dictates that federal law is the supreme law of the land?150
The Court answers this question, quoting New York: “the
Constitution ‘confers upon Congress the power to regulate
individuals, not States[.]’”151
Based on the Murphy Court’s interpretation, this
means that states can authorize any type of conduct, simply
because Congress lacks the power to regulate the states.152
In reality, these authorizations should be meaningless
because Congress still has the authority to prohibit people
from engaging in state-authorized conduct that is preempted
Id. at 1477.
Id. at 1478.
147 Id.
148 See id. (holding PASPA invalid under the anti-commandeering
doctrine for dictating what a state legislature “may not do.”).
149 See infra Part II.A.
150 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
151 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166).
152 C.f. id.
145
146

Journal of Business & Technology Law

154

STIERS

by federal law.153 Therefore, the prohibition of sports
gambling on private businesses and individuals is entirely
permissible under the Supremacy Clause and the anticommandeering doctrine.154 This is exactly what PASPA did
in § 3702(2); thus the Court’s decision in Murphy is quite
puzzling and even more bizarre as applied to severability.155
A logical interpretation of Murphy would lead to a conclusion
that the anti-commandeering doctrine was not significantly
expanded and PASPA might have remained intact if
Congress had never confused the Court by separately
regulating the states in § 3702(1).156
B. The Court’s application of the severability
doctrine was severely misguided, creating
an instance of extreme judicial legislation in
defiance of the principle of political
accountability.
Quoting the Senate Report, Justice Breyer explained
Congress’s purpose for PASPA by stating, “[t]he obvious
answer is that Congress wanted to ‘keep sports gambling
from spreading.’”157 To accomplish that goal, Congress
employed unusual drafting language intended to only
prohibit sports gambling in states that had not already
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476
(explaining preemption, stating “when federal and state law conflict,
federal law prevails and state law is preempted”).
154 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
155 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (2012).
156 The Court’s fragile severability analysis rests on the assumption that
§ 3702(2) of PASPA is meant to support § 3702(1), rather than act as its
own independent provision. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474-1485.
157 Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J. concurring in part dissenting in part) (quoting
S. REP. No. 102–248, at 4–6 (1991)).
153
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authorized sports gambling.158 The Supreme Court’s decision
to invalidate all of PASPA, based on highly speculative
statutory interpretation is quite troubling, especially when
actual legislative intent was available and discussed in
dissenting opinions.159 Part 1 discredits the Court’s
severability analysis. Part 2 questions whether the Court’s
decision
in
Murphy
actually
furthered
political
accountability and suggests that accountability needs to be
addressed under a different area of law.
1. The Court’s severability analysis rested on the
false assumption that § 3702(2) of PASPA could
not or was not intended to preempt all potential
state authorizations of sports gambling.
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg accurately described the
majority’s reasoning as a “plain error [that] pervasively
infects the Court’s severability analysis.”160 The modern
severability test asks “‘[w]ould Congress still have passed’
the valid sections ‘had it known’ about the constitutional
invalidity of the other portions of the statute?”161 This
requires the Court to make an inquiry into statutory
intent.162 The error in the Court’s severability analysis is
See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (prohibiting states from authorizing sports
gambling, implicitly allowing states that had already authorized sports
gambling to continue legal operations); Id. § 3704 (explicitly
grandfathering in states with existing legal gambling schemes and
allowing a one-year window for states with existing casino gambling to
authorize sports gambling).
159 See generally S. REP. No. 102–248 (1991); see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct.
at 1488-90.
160 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1490 (2018) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
161 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (quoting Denver
Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 767 (1996)
(plurality opinion).
162 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1486 (Thomas, J. concurring).
158
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clear from the first inquiry: “If Congress had known that
States would be free to authorize sports gambling in privately
owned casinos, would it have nevertheless wanted to prevent
States from running sports lotteries?”163 The Court
adequately concluded that it would have been odd to allow
sports gambling in casinos, but not in state lotteries,164 but
failed to explain why it is assumed sports gambling in casinos
would not still be prohibited under § 3702(2).165 Next, the
Court wrongly concluded that Congress would not want to
ban sports gambling as private conduct if it were authorized
by state law.166 Both of these conclusions rested on the false
assumptions that § 3702(2) of PASPA would not preempt
state laws authorizing sports wagering or Congress did not
intend § 3702(2) to be interpreted that way.167 § 3702(2)
regulated private conduct, which is entirely permissible
under the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses.168 Therefore,
the Court employed circular reasoning to invalidate §
3702(2), based off a false assumption that § 3702(2)’s
prohibitions on private conduct would not preempt any laws
created by states authorizing sports gambling.169
It is puzzling to consider how the Court managed to
reach its conclusion. Perhaps, if Congress had merely
reversed the order of §§ 3702(1) and 3702(2) of PASPA, first
Id. at 1482 (majority opinion).
See id at 1482-83 (highlighting the irregularity of a statute that would
ban sports gambling through lotteries but allow it in casinos, when lottery
betting is generally considered more benign than heavier wagering in
casinos).
165 See id. at 1488 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that § 3702(2) acted as a failsafe to prohibit sports gambling,
regardless of whether § 3702(1) remained intact).
166 Id. at 1483 (majority opinion) (citing the history of the federal
approach to gambling, which historically only violated federal law under
18 U.S.C. 1953 when gambling was also prohibited under state law).
167 See id. at 1483-84.
168 Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169 See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
163
164
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prohibiting sports gambling as private conduct, and then
barring state authorization as a corollary, the statute would
have been ruled lawful under ordinary federal preemption.170
This reveals the crucial flaw in the Court’s severability
analysis because the Court’s methodology would also allow
any state authorization of private conduct to override a
federal preemption, contradicting the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.171
2. The Court’s holding allowed Congress to
further avoid political accountability.
In Murphy, the Court emphasized the value of political
accountability and concluded the opinion stating “the choice
is not ours to make.”172 In reality, the Supreme Court, rather
than Congress, will be accountable for the legalization of
sports gambling across America.173 The issue of
accountability exposes the crucial flaw of PASPA from its
very onset.174 Congress intended to prevent the spread of
sports gambling, but also wanted to avoid accountability for
economic harm of shutting down existing sports gambling
See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1488 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The first says that a State cannot authorize sports
gambling schemes under state law; the second says that (just in case a
State finds a way to do so) sports gambling schemes that a State
authorizes are unlawful under federal law regardless.”).
171 See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
172 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484 (2018).
173 See Herb Jackson, Sports Betting: Congress May try to Regulate, but
Passage of any Legislation is a Long Shot, USA TODAY NETWORK (May
15, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2018/05/15/sports-betting-congress-may-try-new-regulations-but-oddshigh/609817002/.
174 PASPA was drafted intentionally to avoid political accountability by
allowing states that permitted sports gambling in 1991 to continue lawful
operations, while prohibiting future authorization in states with existing
laws barring sports gambling. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702-3704 (2012).
170
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enterprises.175 By simply stating no state may authorize
sports gambling and incorporating a grandfather clause,
Congress avoided all accountability—sports gambling
remained illegal in states that did not want it, while it
remained legal in states with existing schemes.176 This
allowed Congress to mitigate the harmful effects of sports
gambling without incurring the blame of the harmful
economic effects of shutting down existing sports gambling
enterprises.177 Murphy does not solve this issue of
accountability; Murphy merely prevents Congress from
prohibiting a state governmental entity from creating a
particular law authorizing unwanted conduct. 178 Congress
can still draft laws prohibiting the actual conduct, while
exempting states with laws already allowing such conduct.179
Therefore, Congress could still draft a law identical to PASPA
in effects.180
Like most anti-commandeering cases, Murphy should
not have significant precedential impact, but rather require
Congress to draft more carefully in the future.181 The Court
See, e.g., S. REP. 102-248 at 8 (1992) (“Although the committee firmly
believes that all such sports gambling is harmful, it has no wish to apply
this new prohibition retroactively to Oregon or Delaware, which
instituted sports lotteries prior to the introduction of our legislation.
Neither has the committee any desire to threaten the economy of Nevada,
which over many decades has come to depend on legalized private
gambling, including sports gambling, as an essential industry, or to
prohibit lawful sports gambling schemes in other States that were in
operation when the legislation was introduced.”).
176 See PASPA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702-3704.
177 See supra note 175.
178 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018).
179 C.f. id.
180 C.f. id.
181 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992) (preventing
Congress from drafting future laws directing state governments to carry
out federal regulations); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
935 (1997) (preventing Congress from drafting future laws directing state
officials to carry out federal regulations).
175
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declined to address the core issue with PASPA—whether
Congress can enact laws that prohibit conduct in some states,
while allowing it in others.182 The Third Circuit addressed
this under the doctrine of equal sovereignty of the states in
Christie I, but rejected New Jersey’s claim and the Supreme
Court’s denied certiorari on that issue.183 Likely, the impact
of a federal statute that discriminates among states must
eventually be addressed by the Supreme Court.184
C. Interstate economic competition is affecting
state laws across the country, which may
cause Congress to impose new models of
PASPA, which will need to be addressed
under equal sovereignty.
When PASPA was passed, New Jersey could not foresee the
loss of its casino gambling revenues resulting from casino
legalization in neighboring states.185 Pennsylvania and West
Virginia could not have predicted the Great Recession and
the steep decline of the coal and steel industries, leading for
the need for new revenue sources.186 Maryland could not have
foreseen the emergence of casinos along its northern, eastern,
and western borders.187 States have competing economic
See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 238-39 (3d Cir. 2013) (rejecting the
appellants’ equal sovereignty argument and holding that the principle of
equal sovereignty was meant to apply on the narrow grounds of “sensitive
areas of state and local policymaking.”) (quoting Shelby Cty., Ala. v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013)).
184 See infra Part IV. C.
185 See Dadayan, supra note 141, at 5-7 (analyzing the rapid expansion of
legalized gambling on the East Coast in the last fifteen years).
186 See id. at 6 (explaining the effects of the Great Recession, incentivizing
states to legalize gambling to help balance budgets and curb declining tax
revenues).
187 See id. at 5 (highlighting states’ incentives to legalize gambling to
“counteract interstate competition for gambling revenue.”).
182
183
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interests and these interests are dynamic.188 New Jersey’s
decision to legalize sports gambling was a direct reaction to
the decline of its Atlantic City casinos, resulting from casino
legalization in neighboring states.189
Laws like PASPA leave state economies defenseless
against the economic impact of neighboring states’
legalization of gambling, marijuana, prostitution, and other
future laws that create interstate competition.190 PASPA’s
invalidation remedied this issue as applied to sports
gambling, but did nothing to prevent future laws from being
created in the exact same manner, so long as the drafters
direct prohibitions at conduct rather than the state
authorization of such conduct.191 Part 1 explains how
interstate economic competition may lead to future laws like
PASPA, which will need to be addressed under equal
sovereignty, rather than anti-commandeering. Part 2
assesses the direct effects of Murphy and warns against the
judicial legislation.
1. A wave of legalization of formerly prohibited
conduct is rippling through the states.
Current trends shows that states cannot properly protect
residents from perceived threats192 to social welfare when
See id. at 5-6.
See N.J.S.A. 5:12A-1 (2011) (citing the critical challenges that
jeopardize New Jersey’s casinos as an important backbone of the state
economy and the need to change the regulatory rules to compete in “an
ever-expanding national gaming market.”).
190 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
192 This Article does not intend to take a stance on the social welfare value
of laws prohibiting certain private conduct, but rather intends to
highlight a current economic issue where states are changing laws
designed to police conduct in reaction to external economic forces.
188
189
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those threats are in close vicinity, across state borders.193 In
casino gambling, data showed that propagation of casinos
ultimately had negative effects on the economy of the
states.194 State economies benefit when a large portion of
these revenues are funded by residents of neighboring
states.195 In situations of “border hugging,” neighboring
states face a dilemma: if the state legalizes gambling, then
its residents and its economy will suffer long-term negative
effects.196 If the state elects to keep gambling illegal, then the
state will suffer these same consequences, but the revenue
recouped by the casinos is captured by neighboring states.197
As a result, the majority of states legalized gambling,
accepting the inevitable societal cost in order to reap the
consolation benefit of state casino revenues.198 Equilibrium
See Jamisen Etzel, The House of Cards is Falling: Why States Should
Cooperate on Legal Gambling, 15 N.Y.U. J. OF LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 199,
201 (2012) (documenting the race-to-the-bottom forcing states to change
their laws in response to legislation from neighboring states).
194 See id. at 215-22 (explaining the diminishing and ultimately negative
economic returns from the saturation of casino gambling, resulting in an
equilibrium where states can no longer benefit from tourism revenue,
leading to shrinking economies from residents’ direct losses, businesses
being displaced by casinos, and portions of casino revenue being diverted
out-of-state to corporate employees and shareholders).
195 States cannot grow their economies simply by siphoning income from
their own residents—gambling income has always been funded by
tourism. See id. at 224 (noting over a billion dollar decline in Atlantic
City’s gross revenues, since Pennsylvania legalized casino gambling); see
also Dadayan, supra note 141, at 32 (Appendix Table 8) (showing revenue
declines in older casino states as new states legalized casino gambling).
196 Etzel, supra note 193 at 235-37.
197 Etzel compares this situation to the classic “prisoner’s dilemma.” See
id. at 214-15; 235-36.
198 See Dadayan, supra note 141 at 31 (Appendix Tables 7) (showing the
rapid growth of state-authorized casino gambling from 1990 to 2010); see
also Etzel, supra note 193, at 236 (explaining how border-hugging casinos
benefit by exporting costs, by gaining revenues from out-of-state
193
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occurs when money can no longer be extracted from out-ofstate residents; at this point, all the states suffer the social
and economic consequences.199 The cycle begins once again,
when a new law is created authorizing another formerlyprohibited conduct.200
This pattern is exemplified by the facts surrounding
the current case.201 New Jersey lost its casino gambling
tourism income after neighboring states reacted and
adjusted to New Jersey’s economic advantage.202 New Jersey
attempted to reclaim some of that advantage by authorizing
sports gambling.203 In the short-term, the first state to
authorize conduct reaps the benefits of tourism income, until
neighboring states react, leading to diminishing, and finally
negative returns.204 Unfettered, this pattern can lead to a
long cycle of decay.
PASPA intended to stop the spread of sports gambling,
while protecting Nevada’s economy, which relies heavily on
the gambling industry.205 Regardless of Congress’s
residents, but also unintentionally influence the neighboring states to
change their laws to counteract this gain).
199 These consequences include loss of productivity, displacement of
demand for other goods, a decline in local business, regulatory capture
resulting from state competition to lure gamblers, and increases in
gambling addiction. Etzel, supra note 193, at 214, 228.
200 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1702 (PASPA); see also Etzel, supra note 193, at
229 (citing a Nevada industry campaign to reduce the gambling age from
21 to 18, following the Great Recession and Indiana’s recent amendment
to remove the requirement that riverboat casinos operate on water).
201 See supra Part I.
202 See Etzel, supra note 193, at 207 (“Pennsylvania politicians were
extremely cognizant of the capital outflow caused by Atlantic City casinos
and repeatedly went on record to claim that legalization was needed to
stop it.”).
203 See N.J.S.A. 5:12A-1 et seq. (2011).
204 See Etzel, supra note 193, at 219.
205 See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 8 (“Although the committee firmly believes
that all such sports gambling is harmful, it has no wish to apply this new
prohibition retroactively to Oregon or Delaware, which instituted sports
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intentions, laws must not be structured in this manner.206
Discriminatory federal law-making precludes state
legislatures from defending against neighboring states’
attempts to extract money via tourism revenue.207 Although,
states’ defensive legislation may cause a greater overall
harm,208 it would be more unjust to federally authorize
certain states to exploit the economies of others.209 Given this
lose-lose situation, future protection of residents’ social
welfare likely will fall further into the hands of the Federal
Government.210 The Court’s decision in Murphy will likely
expose this issue by creating a new race-to-the-bottom for
sports gambling.211 Until the Court readdresses the issue of
equal sovereignty from Christie I, the door remains open for
lotteries prior to the introduction of our legislation. Neither has the
committee any desire to threaten the economy of Nevada, which over
many decades has come to depend on legalized private gambling,
including sports gambling. . . . ”).
206 PASPA effectively grants a monopoly on a particular industry to three
states. See id.
207 C.f. Etzel, supra note 193, at 220 (“[S]tate leaders believe that if their
residents are already gambling, it is better that they gamble within the
home state than anywhere else. That is, if a state is already incurring
costs from gambling, it might end up with a better bargain by legalizing
and realizing benefits.”).
208 See id. at 232 (explaining that once an equilibrium is reached where
states are mostly only serving their own residents, revenue influx from
legalized gambling erodes, while socio-economic problems incur).
209 See Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting & Equal
Sovereignty, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 12 (2017) (discussing Senator
Grassley’s proposed amendment to end the PASPA grandfather clause,
citing multiple senators’ discontent with PASPA’s discriminatory
nature).
210 See Etzel, supra note 193, at 245 (“Only the federal government is
capable of creating a consistent regulatory approach that is all
encompassing and based on a single set of objectives.”).
211 See infra Part IV.C.2.
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Congress to make new “stop the spread” laws, discriminating
and disadvantaging certain states.212
2. The Court’s decision in Murphy has directly
sparked another race-to-the-bottom between
states to legalize sports gambling.
“[C]ustomers can’t wait to begin wagering on sports . . . [t]his
region is a hotbed of both professional sports and college
athletics, and we look forward to becoming a destination for
fans in West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, and Washington,
D.C.,” said Scott Saunders, General Manager at Hollywood
Casino in Charles Town, West Virginia.213 Intense
advertising campaigns have already begun, targeting the
dense population of the Washington D.C. suburbs, which is
strikingly reminiscent of the advertising campaigns in the
early 2000s, which led to the domino effect legalization of
casinos across Mid-Atlantic States.214 This time around,
many states learned their lesson and are reacting much
faster in response to neighboring competition.215 New Jersey,
West Virginia, Delaware, and Mississippi swiftly integrated
See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d
208, 239 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated by Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (characterizing PASPA’s policy of
“[t]argeting only states where [sports gambling] did not exist” as a
rational means to stop the spread of sports gambling).
213 Drew Hanson, Sports Betting is Coming to Charles Town. Will it
Impact Maryland's Casinos?, WASH. BUS. J., (Aug. 20, 2018, 8:45 PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2018/08/20/sportsbetting-is-coming-to-charles-town-how-will.html.
214 See supra Part IV.C.1.
215 Ryan Rodenberg, State-by-State Sports Betting Bill Tracker, ESPN,
(last updated Sept. 19, 2018), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/
_/id/19740480/gambling-sports-betting-bill-tracker-all-50-states
(documenting twenty-seven states that have either legalized sports
gambling or are in the process of trying to legalize it).
212
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full scale sports gambling operations at licensed casinos. 216
Additionally, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island
have recently passed bills legalizing sports gambling.217
Other states such as Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia are again suffering the consequences of lagging
behind in this financial footrace.218 Maryland attempted to
pass a bill calling for a referendum on sports gambling, which
passed in the House of Delegates by an overwhelming 124-14
vote.219 However, the bill stymied in the Senate, due to
questions of whether sports gambling should be allowed only
in casinos or also at racetracks.220
Perhaps there is not as great a sense of urgency
regarding sports gambling because sports gambling
encompasses a much smaller market than casino gambling
as a whole.221 Nevertheless, the competitive advantage of
drawing customers from neighboring states is significant
enough to change state laws throughout the country.222 This
Id.
Id.
218 Matt Bonesteel, Legal Sports Gambling Inches Closer to the DMV as
Charles Town Readies Sportsbook for Liftoff, D.C. Sports Bog, WASH.
POST (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/dc-sportsbog/wp/2018/08/09/legal-sports-gambling-inches-closer-to-the-dmv-ascharles-town-readies-sportsbook-for-liftoff/?noredirect=on&utm_term=
.a6702b70ecef.
219 H.D. 1014, 438th Sess. (Md. 2018).
220 Opinion, With Supreme Court Sports Betting Decision, Maryland Will
be Behind the Curve on Gambling Again. That’s Not Such a Big Deal,
BALT. SUN (May 14, 2018), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
opinion/editorial/bs-ed-0515-sports-betting-20180514-story.html.
221 Sports betting only makes up two percent of gaming revenue in
Nevada. Scott Dance, Maryland General Assembly Leaders Open to
Special Session on Sports Betting, but Gov. Hogan is not, BALT. SUN (May
15, 2018, 1:35 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland
/politics/bs-md-sports-betting-session-20180515-story.html.
222 See Rodenberg, supra note 215 (documenting the reactions of twentyseven states taking steps to legalize sports gambling within the first four
months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy).
216
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raises the question of whether states can realistically decide
their own laws on issues that involve interstate economic
competition.
For context, imagine a small state surrounded by other
states with casinos, marijuana dispensaries, and brothels
located minutes from the state borders. Certainly, that state
would be forced to legalize these same establishments or
money would continue to pour across its borders, crippling
the state economy.223 Further, if federal law could prohibit
the small state from legalizing these establishments, the
state would be powerless to protect its economy.224 Therefore,
the federal government will need to intervene at some point,
but it should not recreate discriminatory PASPA-like laws.225
This reality leads back to a critical issue from
Murphy—political accountability.226 Would Congress pass a
law prohibiting a harmful activity if the prohibition damaged
the economies of states already authorizing the activity?227
After Murphy, Congress can no longer disguise
discriminatory laws using phrases like “it shall be unlawful
for a governmental entity to . . . authorize . . . ” a certain type
of conduct—Congress would have to state directly that the
conduct is now illegal, but also exempt the states that already
legalized that conduct.228 For example, Congress could
prohibit recreational marijuana use as conduct, and then
exempt Alaska, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, the
District of Columbia, Oregon, Washington.229 Such a law
C.f. Etzel, supra note 193, at 236 (explaining the issue of borderhugging).
224 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
225 See id.
226 See Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477
(2018).
227 See supra Part IV.B.2.
228 See PASPA 28 U.S.C. § 3702.
229 See id.; see also State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, GOVERNING: THE
STATES AND LOCALITIES (Mar. 30, 2018), http://www.governing.com/gov223
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would be entirely permissible under Murphy, but Congress
might not want to expose itself to the scrutiny of a blatantly
discriminatory statute.230 In this example, Congress would
be forced to take accountability in the future: either (1) for
shutting down recreational marijuana dispensaries and
harming state economies231 or (2) for making a law that
clearly discriminates among states.232 If employed, the
second option should eventually be held unconstitutional—
certainly the Constitution did not intend to give the federal
government the authority to decide which states can thrive
and which states must suffer economic decline.233
Nevertheless, it is still uncertain whether Congress
would actually assume the political accountability for
prohibiting potentially harmful conduct across all states
when that conduct is legal and supported by industries in
certain states.234 This particular accountability issue speaks
more to the nature of a representative democracy than a
discussion for the Court.235 In reality, the potential harm of
data/safety-justice/state-marijuana-laws-map-medicalrecreational.html.
230 See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text.
231 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
232 See Equal Sovereignty, supra Part II.B.
233 The Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibits states from imposing
laws preventing citizens from traveling to and engaging in lawful conduct
in other states. If states are federally prohibited from imposing the same
laws on their own citizens, then those states could be subject to a severe
and unresolvable competitive disadvantage, which runs contrary to the
structure of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see
also infra Part II.B.
234 See, e.g., S. REP. 102-248 at 8 (1992) (explicitly stating that Congress
did not want PASPA to prohibit sports gambling in all of the states to
avoid harming Nevada’s sports gambling industry).
235 The question of whether Congress will or will not assume
accountability for passing a statute is an issue of deference to the will of
the people rather than an issue of allocating accountability between the
federal and state governments. C.f. Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018).
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the conduct to be regulated is not as determinative as its
popularity, although these factors are correlated.236
Certainly, Congress could pass general prohibitions across
the states, but will only assume accountability if the
prohibitions gain sufficient popularity to outweigh the
negative sentiment, associated with shutting down
industries and cutting jobs.237
If the Supreme Court invalidated the next PASPA-like
law on equal sovereignty grounds, this would at least restore
the natural structure of our democracy.238 The federal
government could regulate issues stemming from interstate
economic competition and ultimately those regulations would
be decided by the people.239
CONCLUSION
In Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the Court
invalidated PASPA for violating the anti-commandeering
doctrine under the Tenth Amendment.240 This decision is
unsettling because the legal analysis was quite arbitrary,
while the actual impact of the decision reshaped gambling
laws across the country.241 Murphy was decided by a divided
Court and grounded largely on uncertain statutory
interpretation, relating to anti-commandeering and
severability.242 The case failed to resolve PASPA’s crucial
See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203 provides an
example of a federal regulation across all states that gained enough
popularity with the people to outweigh the economic costs.
238 See supra Part II.B.
239 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
240 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1473-74
(2018).
241 See supra Part IV.B.
242 See generally Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct.
1461, 1473-74 (2018).
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flaw because certiorari was granted for the wrong question of
law.243 PASPA was invalidated, yet an effectively identical
law could still be enacted.244 These issues will need to be
reevaluated in the near future on equal sovereignty grounds.
243
244

See supra Part IV.C.
See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
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